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The Shady Side of Consultation and Compensation:
‘Divide-and-Rule’ Tactics in Bolivia’s Extraction Sector
Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Jessika Eichler
ABSTRACT
The rights to prior consultation and compensation have been established
within the framework of international indigenous peoples’ rights. However,
in practice these processes have often gone hand in hand with adverse social
consequences for local populations, such as the exacerbation of conflicts,
the division of communities and the weakening of indigenous organizations.
These phenomena have received little attention, despite their great relevance
for these populations. This article sheds light on the use by the Bolivian state
and extraction corporations of exclusionary participation and negotiation
processes, on the one hand, and ‘carrot-and-stick’ techniques on the other,
which have together accounted for negative social impacts on the ground.
The article is based on recently conducted field research, focus group discus-
sions and semi-structured interviews in Guaranı´ communities in Bolivia. The
findings extend the existing literature by providing a fine-grained and sys-
tematic analysis of divisive undertakings and their sociocultural and socio-
political consequences in neo-extractivist Bolivia. The broader implications
of the study add to academic debates about participation in development,
about ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics and about the practice of indigenous peoples’
rights.
INTRODUCTION
The further enhancement of extractivist and neo-extractivist development
paths in the 21st century has attracted increasing academic and public
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attention, particularly from scholars of Latin America. In a neo-extractivist
regime, the state maintains a style of development based on the appropria-
tion of nature, albeit with a more active role for the state and an increasing
share of revenues used to finance social policies (Burchardt and Dietz, 2014;
Siegel, 2016; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). Gudynas (2010) argued that al-
though neo-extractivism has enjoyed a greater legitimacy than traditional
extractivism, due to the increased distribution of surplus to the population,
it nevertheless replicates the negative environmental and social impacts of
the old extractivism. These negative, or at least ambiguous, consequences
of mining and hydrocarbon activities — such as the deterioration of local
environments, an increasing scarcity of livelihoods available for local pop-
ulations and the exacerbation of conflicts between states, corporations and
local populations, including indigenous peoples — have been comprehen-
sively discussed in the literature (see Bebbington, 2011; Bebbington and
Bury, 2013; Haarstad, 2012; Li, 2015). There is also a sizeable body of
work about the shift of Latin American countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and
Venezuela from neoliberal to neo-extractivist regimes. In Bolivia, state dis-
courses and the national development plan have indicated that a progressive
form of neo-extractivism is to be established. This course of action is to
include wealth redistribution, effective environmental policies and strong
participatory rights, especially for indigenous peoples (see Andreucci and
Radhuber, 2015; Postero, 2007; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017a).
In this context, Bolivia began to implement prior consultation processes
with indigenous and peasant communities in 2007. It thereby assumed a
pioneering role in Latin America, where the great majority of states — with
the exception of Colombia and Peru — have not complied with their legal
obligation to fulfil indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation and to free,
prior and informed consent (FPIC). The organization of state-led prior con-
sultation processes had been a long-standing demand of Bolivia’s indigenous
lowland peoples, who previously negotiated directly with transnational cor-
porations (Anthias, 2012; Hindery, 2013). The widespread expectation was
that, by undertaking a mediating role in the relations between the indigenous
peoples affected by resource extraction and the interested corporations, the
state could help uphold indigenous and environmental rights and counter-
balance the enormous power asymmetries that exist between the corporations
and the communities.
However, during fieldwork in local settings, the authors of this article
have been confronted with the severe negative social consequences of prior
consultation and company-led negotiations over compensation for local pop-
ulations such as the Guaranı´ in Bolivia’s Chaco area. Looking more deeply
into the lives of community members and participating in the assemblies
of indigenous organizations, it becomes clear that what local actors refer
to as pasivos sociales (social impacts) from extraction projects cannot be
overlooked. Among the many negative social impacts, our study revealed
divisions within and between communities; the weakening of indigenous
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organizations; increased distrust on the part of the constituency vis-a`-vis
indigenous authorities; and the exacerbation of local conflicts.NellyRomero,
an experienced and well-respected indigenous leader, emphasized dur-
ing a meeting of the national Assembly of Guaranı´ People (APG) that
the most severe impacts that the Guaranı´ have suffered from the hydro-
carbon industry have been the social ones (field notes, Camiri, 25 Novem-
ber 2014). While this phenomenon has received little attention in previous
scholarly literature, we consider it to be of utmost importance. In the long
run, fragmented organizations will have a diminished capacity to defend
their claims, to organize collective action and, ultimately, to uphold their
rights (see Bebbington et al., 2008; O’Faircheallaigh, 2008; Sawyer, 2004).
The ethnographic methods we have applied in our study allow us to shed
light on the micro-dynamics at play, including the concrete interactions
between diverse actors. Hence, the questions that interest us here are the
following: in what ways have indigenous communities and organizations
been adversely affected, socioculturally and sociopolitically, by consulta-
tion and compensation practices? How are local divisions and conflicts
exacerbated by state-led consultations and company-led negotiations over
compensation?
Previous research into consultation practices in Bolivia has discussed its
various shortcomings: the contested interpretation of consultation and con-
sent rights, which has made it difficult to put these rights into practice;
the large power asymmetries that have shaped these processes to the dis-
advantage of local populations; the biased and incomplete information that
has been disseminated; and the participants’ lack of influence on the de-
sign and execution of extraction projects (Bascope´ Sanjı´nes, 2010; Flemmer
and Schilling-Vacaflor, 2016; Fontana and Grugel, 2016; Haarstad, 2014;
Humphreys Bebbington, 2012). Embedded in their broader analyses, a few
articles have also argued that consultation processes and the related compen-
sation payments have exacerbated local conflicts (Humphreys Bebbington,
2012; Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014). In
this article we draw on this previous research but also aim to extend it in
three respects. First, we disentangle and analyse in fine-grained detail the
specific practices and mechanisms related to consultation and compensation
practices — meant to empower indigenous peoples and protect their rights
— which have led to negative social consequences for local populations. As
part of this analysis, we also briefly illustrate theGuaranı´ strategies employed
to counteract divisive practices and to maintain unity. Second, we discuss
the existing literature on the divisive practices fostered by transnational ex-
traction corporations in neoliberal regimes (Bell, 2014; Guzma´n-Gallegos,
2012; Hindery, 2013; Sawyer, 2004; Warnaars, 2013; Watts, 2013) and ex-
plain how and why similar mechanisms have been at work in plurinational
and neo-extractivist Bolivia. Hence, we not only scrutinize the interactions
between companies and local populations, but also analyse the important
role that the state has played within these encounters. Third, we discuss how
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the processes analysed have been shaped by and are in turn transforming
sociocultural patterns within the indigenous Guaranı´ communities involved
in our study. To do this, we embed our findings in the broader ethno-
historical context of Bolivia’s Guaranı´ people. Finally, we discuss the
broader implications of our study with regard to collective rights, indigenous
politics and natural resource extraction.
Both authors of this article have carried out extensive field research
on prior consultation processes in Guaranı´ communities in Bolivia’s
hydrocarbon-rich department of Santa Cruz. The first author carried out
field research for a total of 12 months during different research stays be-
tween September 2013 and November 2015, including one of approximately
threemonths in theGuaranı´ Parapitiguasu captaincy.1 The second author car-
ried out approximately 12 months of fieldwork (April 2014 to April 2015),
including six months of field research in the Guaranı´ captaincy of Alto
Parapeti. We both participated as observers in consultation processes and
internal assemblies of the APG and conducted a total of 120 semi-structured
interviews and several focus group discussions with local actors, and with
representatives from the central state and from private and public hydro-
carbon corporations. As a consequence of conflicts surrounding consultation
and compensation, some communities from Alto Parapeti split and founded
the new captaincy, N˜embuite, and some communities from Parapitiguasu
split and founded the new captaincy, Boyuibe. Field research was there-
fore also conducted in these newly founded captaincies. In order to enhance
inclusiveness, interviews were conducted in both Spanish and Guaranı´, de-
pending on community members’ personal preference. While this study is
based on insights from Bolivia, many case studies from other countries both
within and outside of Latin America indicate that the practices discussed
here are of much broader relevance.
The remainder of the article begins with a short outline of our theoreti-
cal framework; the following section then provides information about gas
projects, consultation and compensation in Guaranı´ territories in Bolivia.
Thereafter, we discuss the two main ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics used by the
Bolivian state and extraction corporations: (1) exclusive state-led partici-
patory processes and company–community negotiations over compensation
payments; and (2) ‘carrot-and-stick’ techniques. We also briefly present dif-
ferent initiatives introduced by the Guaranı´ to counteract divisive practices
and maintain unity. In a subsequent analytical section we reflect upon our
findings and their broader implications regarding the practice of indigenous
rights in the context of natural resource extraction.
1. The term ‘captaincy’ (capitanı´a) is a legacy from the colonial period (Combe`s and Lowrey,
2006). Captaincies are composed of local Guaranı´ communities that affiliate with and form
a larger subnational political-territorial entity.
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INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
Indigenous peoples and other land-connected groups have suffered dispro-
portionally from the negative consequences that extraction projects have had
on their environment and livelihoods (Anaya, 2015; Bebbington and Bury,
2013; Haller et al., 2007). The particular vulnerability of indigenous peo-
ples has largely been due to these groups’ historically marginalized position
in society and their close relationship with ancestral lands and territories,
as a source both of survival and of their distinctive cultural identity. As a
consequence of the weak bargaining position of many indigenous groups,
their lands and resources have often been appropriated or severely affected
without meaningful consultation or consent.
Against this background, indigenous peoples’ right to prior consultation
and to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), as well as their rights to
be compensated for adverse impacts from extraction projects and to receive
a share of the benefits whenever possible, have been conceived of as safe-
guards for protecting the rights that might be at stake for local populations.
Interestingly, these safeguards began to emerge at a time when the World
Bank was promoting the privatization of hydrocarbons and mining indus-
tries in numerous developing countries (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2015: 259).
Hence, critical scholars argued that indigenous rights have not only been es-
tablished to support indigenous peoples, but also to ensure the governability
of extraction and foster the legitimacy of the neoliberal development model
(Anthias and Radcliffe, 2015; Goodale, 2016; Hale, 2002).
In theory, consultation processes do not involve the granting of decision-
making authority to participants, while consent involves sharing or trans-
ferring authority (Szablowski, 2010). As a consequence, FPIC can be used
by affected communities as leverage to shape decision making, including
to avoid projects that present them with more risks than benefits. In prac-
tice, however, it can be difficult to clearly distinguish between consultation
and consent regimes, because the interpretation of consultation and consent
rights has often been contested and formal requirements tend to be ambigu-
ous or a hybrid.2 When speaking of the right in general, we will use the
term ‘right to prior consultation and FPIC’, while when analysing concrete
consultation practices in Bolivia we will speak of ‘prior consultation pro-
cesses’, because in our opinion these latter practices do not qualify as FPIC
processes.
International standards about the right to prior consultation and FPIC —
such as the International Labour Organization Convention 169 (ILO C169)
2. In addition, the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) — consentimiento previo,
libre e informado (CPLI) in Spanish — is sometimes wrongly reported as consulta previa
(prior consultation), and consulta previa is sometimes confusedwith consulta pu´blica (public
consultation according to Bolivia’s environmental legislation), all of which further add to
the confusion between these concepts and rights.
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and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) — have established that these processes should be carried out
in good faith3 prior to any planned measure affecting indigenous peoples,
should involve the representative persons and institutions of affected com-
munities, and should be based on an intercultural dialogue. They have also
stipulated that the participants should be given complete and non-biased
information about the measures at stake (Rodrı´guez Garavito et al., 2010).
These processes should either conclude with a binding agreement or achieve
the consent (or withholding of consent) of the participants. Increasing num-
bers of transnational extraction companies, international finance institutions
and international organizations— such as the International Council on Min-
ing and Metals, the International Finance Corporation, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank — have
expressed their commitment to respect the principle of prior consultation
or FPIC. However, no monitoring bodies have been established within the
corporate social responsibility (CSR) sector, and legally binding norms are
still absent. The state duties and corporation commitments have usually not
been implemented in practice. Where prior consultation processes have been
carried out, as in Bolivia, these processes have usually been characterized
by serious shortcomings such as those mentiond above.
In this article we argue that consultation processes have in many cases
also contributed to adverse sociopolitical and sociocultural impacts in local
contexts and to disempowering groups that were already in a disadvantaged
position among local populations. Our insights connect to previous findings
from scholars of participatory development. Research into citizen participa-
tion has discussed the deficiencies of many participation processes, such as
their frequently top-down character or the participants’ lack of ownership
and actual influence (Akbulut, 2012; Cooke and Kothari, 2001). There has
also been criticism of the fact that, within participatory approaches, ‘com-
munities’ are all too often treated as fixed and unproblematic homogeneous
entities, thereby contributing to ‘draw[ing] a veil over repressive structures
(of gender, class, caste and ethnicity) operating at themicro-scale’ (Williams,
2004: 562; see also Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Research has shown that the
failure to take local power asymmetries into account in participatory pro-
cesses often leads to the exacerbation of inequality and conflict at the local
level. This has in many cases contributed to benefit-capture on the part of
local elites and the further marginalization of vulnerable subgroups (Agar-
wal, 2001; Akbulut, 2012; Bottazzi et al., 2014; Dill, 2009; Masaki, 2009;
Mompati and Prinsen, 2000).
We additionally argue that in the Bolivian cases studied here, the en-
hancement of exclusionary participation or negotiation and the privileging
3. For example, the Inter-American jurisprudence has specified that bribing community leaders
or negotiating with individual community members would be regarded as violating the
principle of good faith (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2012).
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of local leaders and elites was not just an unintended consequence of partici-
patory exercises that did not sufficiently take local complexity into account.
We demonstrate how divide-and-rule tactics were applied intentionally by
both the participating state entities and extraction companies as a governing
technique. Posner et al. (2010: 450) argue that ‘divide and conquer is an
attractive solution [for imperial and colonial powers], because it is cheaper
to set factions within the latent opposition to fighting among themselves,
and if necessary to defeat them piecemeal, than it is to defeat them as a
unified enemy’. Posner et al. stipulate two conditions that are essential to
any divide-and-conquer mechanism: (1) a unitary actor bargaining with or
competing against a set of multiple actors; and (2) the unitary actor following
an intentional strategy of exploiting problems of coordination or collective
action among the multiple actors. Posner et al. distinguish between differ-
ent divide-and-conquer tactics; the most important for our analysis here is
limiting the frequency or duration of interaction among the dominated ac-
tors, sowing the seeds of distrust, paying bribes and imposing penalties. To
this we could add co-optation strategies, which ‘are brought into play when
individual movement leaders are offered rewards that advance them as indi-
viduals while ignoring the collective goals of the movement’ (Miller, 1999:
305). This form of dominance was widely used in the colonial era (Hill,
2004; Mamdani, 2012). Many recent studies (see above) and media articles
(e.g. Allicock, 2014; IWGIA, 2014) suggest that contemporary forms of
corporate conduct in different world regions have also often included such
dividing tactics. In the following we shed light on the divide-and-rule tactics
used by the Bolivian state and extraction corporations in the context of con-
sultation and compensation exercises and discuss the broader implications
of our study.
GAS PROJECTS, CONSULTATION AND COMPENSATION IN GUARANI´
TERRITORIES
The extractive industries, already active in all LatinAmerican countries, have
seen further expansion in the 21st century. In Bolivia, the production of gas
tripled between 2000 and 2008, and in 2011 the country’s exports of primary
commodities accounted for almost 96 per cent of its total exports (Veltmeyer,
2014: 84). As a consequence of the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector
in 2005, the Bolivian state’s revenues have increased considerably, and these
revenues have been used in part to enhance public corporations and expand
social policies (Kohl and Farthing, 2012). The increased role of the state in
the country’s economy, coupled with measures to enhance social welfare,
enjoys wide support and legitimacy among Bolivia’s citizens (Gustafson,
2013a; Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Postero, 2007).
At the same time, under the government of President EvoMorales, Bolivia
has become the world leader in the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights
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(see Schavelzon, 2012; Tapia, 2010). In November 2007, Bolivia became
the first — and to date the only — country to adopt the UNDRIP as domes-
tic law (Law 3760). In 2009, Bolivia adopted its new constitution, which
declares that the state is plurinational. The new constitution contains many
elements which move the country away from neoliberalism and establish in-
stead a progressive form of neo-extractivism, including strong participatory,
indigenous and environmental rights.
However, recent scholarly literature has drawn attention to the limita-
tions of Bolivia’s plurinational state and neo-extractivist regime. Scholars
have argued that the nationalization process has been limited and that many
neoliberal elements still persist within the state (Andreucci and Radhuber,
2015; Kaup, 2010; Veltmeyer, 2014). In addition, it has been convincingly
shown that the Bolivian government has clearly prioritized the expansion of
the extractive industries, while the enhancement of a plurinational state with
strong indigenous rights, participatory rights and the protection of ‘mother
earth’ have remained subordinate objectives (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2015;
Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011; Haarstad, 2014; Hindery,
2013). State actors have increasingly aligned with the interests of the ex-
tractive industries. In this context, many domestic laws and decrees that
severely restrict indigenous rights, for example regarding indigenous au-
tonomies (Tockman and Cameron, 2014), mining (Andreucci and Radhu-
ber, 2015) and the right to prior consultation and FPIC (Schilling-Vacaflor,
2017b), have been adopted in the past few years.4
The expansion of projects to explore, exploit and transport gas has seri-
ously affected the Guaranı´, one of Bolivia’s 34 constitutionally recognized
indigenous lowland peoples. It is estimated that approximately 85 per cent
of the country’s gas reserves lie in Bolivia’s Chaco area in the departments
Tarija, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca, and many hydrocarbon projects overlap
with territories inhabited by the Guaranı´ (Hinojosa, 2012: 31). Today the
Guaranı´ represent approximately 25 per cent of the Chaco region’s 300,000
people (Gustafson, 2013b). The Guaranı´ — also referred to as Chiriguano in
the ethnohistorical literature — consist of a not-always-harmonious fusion
of Guaranı´ from Paraguay, who immigrated to Bolivia in pre-Hispanic times,
and Bolivian autochthonous Chane´ (Arawak) groups (Saignes, 2007). They
were colonized relatively late, in the course of the 19th century.
Anthropologists have emphasized that the Guaranı´ culture has been char-
acterized by the absence of a division between rulers and subordinates, and
4. In the recent past the Bolivian government has released four supreme decrees (SD) that
are directly related to extraction projects and indigenous rights, all of which have been
vehemently opposed by the APG. SD 2195, from November 2014, established upper limits
between 0.3 and 1.5 per cent of the investment sums of hydrocarbon projects for compensa-
tion payments to the inhabitants of collective lands according to different project types. SD
2298 states that prior consultation processes should not surpass a maximum duration of 45
days; SD 2366 authorizes hydrocarbon activities in protected areas; and SD 2368 declares
that gas ducts are of national interest. These three latter decrees were adopted in May 2015.
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the rejection of the imposition of a strong leader vis-a`-vis other members of
the group (Hirsch, 1999; Saignes, 2007: 18). However, research has shown
that the self-governing system of the Guaranı´ has in practice very often di-
verged from the ideal of an egalitarian system. Different reasons have been
suggested for these divergences. It has been argued that first colonial forces
and thereafter the national state — which has become increasingly power-
ful in the past few centuries — intentionally used divide-and-rule tactics,
whereby the role of indigenous leaders was strengthened and internal dis-
putes among the Guaranı´ exacerbated (Postero, 2007; Saignes, 2007). For
example, the Swedish anthropologist Nordenskio¨ld remarked in 1909: ‘Un-
fortunately, in the combat between the conquistadors and the Indios, some
chiefs have almost always fought on the side of the enemies of their own
tribe’ (Nordenskio¨ld, 1912/2002: 215). The other side of this argument is that
Guaranı´ leaders have often seized any opportunities to increase their own
or their extended families’ economic and political power (see Albo´, 1990).
For example, during the 1950s many Guaranı´ authorities worked as labour
recruiters for large landowners and oftenmismanaged the salaries of Guaranı´
workers (Hirsch, 1999: 69). In addition, Combe`s and Lowrey (2006) argue
that there have been important differences between the political systems
of the Chane´ and the Guaranı´: indigenous leadership in the Chane´ model
has been hereditary and relatively authoritarian, while the Guaranı´ model
has been more egalitarian and consensus-based. These authors argue that
the fusion between the Guaranı´ and Chane´ groups has led to problems and
tensions due to the competition between these two political traditions within
contemporary Guaranı´ organizations.
The Guaranı´ have played an important role in the Confederation of Indige-
nous Lowland Peoples in Bolivia (CIDOB), which has represented Bolivia’s
indigenous lowland peoples since its founding in 1982. In 1987 they founded
their own national organization, APG (Assembly of Guaranı´ People), which
represents the Guaranı´ from all three departments and all (currently 28)
captaincies. Each captaincy is composed of its affiliated local communities.
At each level — national, captaincy and local or community — Guaranı´
self-governing structures are in place, always including one president, a vice
president and staff, who are responsible for specific issues like production,
education, land and territory, gender, and natural resources. Non-indigenous
persons who have been accepted as members of Guaranı´ communities can
also be elected as mandate holders. According to the norms and procedures
of the Guaranı´, such as those codified in the captaincies’ statutes, important
decisions are usually taken in assemblies convened at the respective levels.
It is worth noting at this stage that the affiliation of Guaranı´ communities at
the captaincy and national levels, as well as the organizations’ separation of
tasks, are relatively recent inventions. They emerged in response to the new
opportunities opened up by flourishing international development projects
for indigenous people on the one hand, and increasing threats related to the
expansion of agro-industrial businesses and gas projects and the movement
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of highland immigrants into territories claimed by the Guaranı´, on the other
(see Postero, 2007).
The Guaranı´ are the indigenous group that has had the most experience
with hydrocarbon activities in Bolivia. They have also fought to incorporate
indigenous rights in Bolivia’s sector-specific legislation. As a consequence,
the new Hydrocarbon Law 3058 of 2005 included indigenous rights to prior
consultation, compensation and indemnity payments for the first time. In
2007, under President Evo Morales, the Guaranı´ successfully secured the
adoption of Supreme Decree (SD) 29033, which regulates the right to prior
consultation in Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector.
According to Bolivia’s legislation, prior consultation processes are carried
out under the umbrella of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy (MHE),
by a team for socio-environmental affairs. This means that in contrast to
Bolivia’s neoliberal past, when affected populations negotiated directly with
extraction companies, the state has been playing a more active role in recent
years. Nevertheless, extraction corporations have strongly influenced con-
sultation processes by providing one-sided pro-extraction information about
the planned projects and their impacts, contained in environmental impact as-
sessment studies (EIA), and through the use of informal means (for more on
this, see Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017a). The financing of EIAs by corporations,
resulting in documents that are shaped by ‘corporate science’ (Kirsch, 2014)
and that minimize expected negative impacts, has been a common practice
in Latin America and elsewhere (see Leifsen et al., 2017). However, it has
contradicted the principle that the state, being the main duty bearer of rights,
shall guarantee the provision of non-biased and complete information in prior
consultation processes. According to SD 29033 the consultation processes
should consist of the following phases: (a) coordination and information;
(b) coordination and joint planning of the consultation; (c) execution of the
consultation; and (d) conciliation. The consultation processes are to con-
clude with an agreement signed by both the MHE consultation team and the
indigenous populations involved (on the final consultation agreements, see
Schilling-Vacaflor, 2014).
Between 2007 and 2015, 58 prior consultation processeswere concluded in
Bolivia; 42 of them involvedGuaranı´ communities. The final agreements that
are the result of the consultation processes are eventually incorporated into an
EIA. The corporationmust provide compensation for those impacts classified
as long term, direct and irreversible in the final consultation agreement, with
the concrete sums involved being established during negotiations between
the indigenous organizations and the corporation in question.
STATE AND COMPANY DIVIDE-AND-RULE TACTICS
The ethnographic methods we used in our study allowed us to explore
the specific practices and micro-dynamics at play in state-led consultation
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processes and company-led negotiations over compensation payments. We
found that in these processes the main objective of the state entity and the
corporations involved is to get the ‘social licence to operate’ as quickly and
easily as possible. To achieve this aim, they both use divisive tactics, which
have had negative consequences for social relations within and between lo-
cal communities and between indigenous leaders and their constituencies.
However, we also show that divide-and-rule tactics have not always been
successful and that in some cases Guaranı´ organizations have brought for-
ward different initiatives to counteract divisive endeavours and to maintain
their unity.
Exclusive Participation in State-led Consultation and Company-led Negotiations
When carrying out prior consultation or negotiating the amount of com-
pensation payments for irreparable damages, the state and the extraction
companies have avoided encounters with the Guaranı´ in the kind of inclu-
sive assemblies which play a key role for indigenous peoples such as the
Guaranı´. Garcı´a Linera et al. (2005: 237) emphasized that especially for the
APG, assemblies with a consensual form of decision making are of primor-
dial importance for writing resolutions, making decisions about collective
actions and for the construction of shared interpretative frameworks. Nev-
ertheless, in disrespect of local norms and procedures, arenas of ‘exclusive
participation’ (Agarwal, 2001) or negotiations with individual community
leaders have been fostered by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy and
the public and private extraction companies alike. The MHE has generally
argued that more inclusive and more comprehensive consultations would be
impossible because of time and budget constraints (field notes, prior consul-
tation with Takovo Mora, 11 November 2013). It is, however, an important
social fact that many community members doubt the sincerity of this justi-
fication, arguing that ‘the reason behind is that the less we see and ask, the
better for the company!’.5
Before prior consultations begin, the MHE and the local Guaranı´ organi-
zation establish a joint consultation plan. While the state generally tries to
limit the entire procedure to narrow administrative formalities, the Guaranı´
have usually pressed for more comprehensive, more inclusive and more ex-
pensive participatory processes. Active participation has also been limited
within the meetings themselves, as a result of the technical and legal lan-
guage that has characterized these encounters. Specialized capacities on the
part of local leaders or advisers have been required in order for communities
to engage in an informed dialogue with MHE staff. This is especially the
case because the drafts of the EIAs — highly technical documents that are
difficult for lay-people to understand — form the basis for discussing the
5. Interview, advisor from Alto Parapetı´, Camiri, 11 October 2014.
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project’s anticipated impacts. Prior consultation has therefore become a di-
alogue between a few skilled individuals and the MHE, while participating
community members have been relegated to the spectator benches (field
notes, prior consultation processes with Takovo Mora and Alto Parapetı´).
Instead of changing the information used, or the methodology and the form
of communication within prior consultations, the MHE has used the lack of
active participation by most community members as an argument to justify
the limited number of consultation participants.6 The MHE has refused to
finance any further internal meetings on the part of the local communities in
which they could deliberate about the planned extraction projects affecting
them.
The frequent state and company practice of negotiating with (and pres-
suring) individual leaders rather than engaging with inclusive assemblies
suggests that these exclusive negotiations are undertaken intentionally. In
several cases the MHE has approached individual leaders in order to obtain
the ‘social licence’ more quickly and easily than would be the case when
dealing with inclusive assemblies. Likewise, hydrocarbon corporations have
often negotiated compensation payments behind closed doors with a few se-
lected leaders, in a framework of secretive discussions (see Humphreys
Bebbington, 2012: 64). The use and administration of compensation pay-
ments have also provoked serious conflicts and divisions at the local level,
debilitating indigenous organizations and reducing the development impact
of gas rents (see Hinojosa et al., 2015; Humphreys Bebbington, 2012).While
individual interests have played a role, exclusive negotiation practices have
further fuelled local redistributive conflicts.
The Alto Parapeti captaincy has already been involved in more than
a dozen prior consultation processes. However, as its communities have
only recently been liberated from contemporary forms of slavery and debt-
bondage systems, their organizational structures are rather weak and vul-
nerable (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2009). Most con-
sultation processes with Alto Parapeti have taken place in the urban centre,
Camiri, which has hindered the majority of community members from par-
ticipating. As the overall budgets have been limited, only one or two persons
per community have been able to participate. Since food, travel and living
allowances are administered by a few individuals within indigenous organ-
izations, it has mostly been the relatives of these persons who have been
invited to participate.7 The participation of women and the elderly — both
groups that usually possess important traditional knowledge, for example
on flora and fauna, which is decisive in determining the social and environ-
mental impacts of extraction projects — has been limited.
Many of our interviewees remarked that in Alto Parapeti decision-making
powers and the administration of funds were controlled by a few leaders,
6. Interview, director of MHE consultation team, La Paz, 14 January 2014.
7. Interviews in Alto Parapeti.
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some of whom no longer resided in the communities. One community,
Karaparecito, stands out as particularly powerful: mandate holders in the
captaincy usually originate from this community and tend to ensure that
consultation and compensation benefits enrich their proximate environment.
In the past, several private companies fostered Karaparecito’s privileged po-
sition by allocating benefits to its communitymembers and thereby excluding
other communities that were also affected by the same projects. Geograph-
ically distant communities reacted by forming an oppositional movement
in order to counter the exclusionary circulation of resources, eventually
founding N˜embuite captaincy.
At the time of our fieldwork, Parapitiguasu captaincy had only partici-
pated in one prior consultation process, which took place in 2011 regarding
a large seismic exploration. Its experiences with exclusionary consultation
processes and the negotiation of compensation payments resemble those of
Alto Parapeti. A community member from Parapitiguasu told us: ‘The MHE
invited us to a meeting. We met and took a consensual decision. Afterwards
MHE staff approached the captaincy’s directorate and the decision that we
had taken beforehand was changed. . . . That was our weakness, that was
the moment when we fell and we started to fight among ourselves’.8 In this
case, the captaincy’s directorate was not only over-hasty in signing the final
consultation agreement, but also subsequently accepted the company’s of-
fer of a compensation payment of approximately US$ 140,000, despite the
fact that — according to assembly decisions — the compensation should
have been much higher. These compensation payments have been trans-
ferred to the captaincy’s bank account and are administered by the Guaranı´
leaders.
The communities in the municipality of Boyuibe are located a few hours
away from Parapitiguasu’s centre, San Antonio, where the captaincy’s office
is located andwheremost assemblies and important meetings take place. The
remote communities had very few representatives within the zone’s direc-
torate, and their members expressed the view that compensation payments
disproportionately benefited the centre of the captaincy and the nearby com-
munities.9 The MHE initially did not invite the communities from Boyuibe
municipality to the consultation meetings, which further exacerbated local
tensions. When Boyuibe’s communities learned that a new gas duct was to
be built that would directly affect them, they split from Parapitiguasu and
founded their own captaincy of Boyuibe. This allowed them to participate
in the consultation process and the subsequent company–community nego-
tiations over compensation payments exclusively, without the presence of
the other communities from Parapitiguasu.
8. Interview, community member, Parapitiguasu, 28 October 2013.
9. Interviews and field notes, Parapitiguasu and Boyuibe.
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Carrot-and-Stick Techniques
So-called carrot-and-stick techniques have further complicated the picture.
Companies have often preferred to negotiate with indigenous leaders and
community members who show a certain ‘flexibility’ and who are more
prone to accept their plans and ideas. To reward pro-extraction attitudes or
to co-opt specific local leaders, they, as well as the state, have offered jobs,
goods, money or other gifts. Side payments have been made for the granting
of individual permits. The Bolivian state has divided representative organi-
zations by favouring or including those sectors that are less critical towards
the government and extraction activities and by repressing or excluding
the more critical ones. Hence, local experiences and narratives point to the
co-occurrence of carrot-and-stick techniques and exclusive negotiations.
In the Alto Parapeti captaincy, the local populations tried to reverse an
environmental licence granted in 2007 to the company Total E&P, argu-
ing, ‘The project got the green light, but it was under pressure, buying the
conscience of the authorities of the indigenous representatives . . . . The
communal authorities have been given good jobs’ (Gine´ and Villarroel,
2011: 46). In February 2014, the community mobilized, on the grounds that
‘the company has systematically misrecognized our rights and their func-
tionaries have used diverse ploys to divide our community organizations’.10
Not only did police forces combat the captaincy’s protest but, according to
several interviews with community members, the company also bribed their
leaders in order to get them to abstain from future collective action against
the company.
In Parapitiguasu many of the local leaders who had engaged in exclusive
negotiations with the MHE during the consultation process were subse-
quently employed as socio-environmental monitors by the state-owned hy-
drocarbon companyYacimientos Petrolı´feros Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB).11
These pro-extraction leaders were employed, despite the fact that other in-
dividuals had already been elected to work on the communities’ behalf,
monitoring the companies’ practices and holding the corporations account-
able. These elections had been communicated to the extraction companies,
in the expectation that they would be respected. In spite of this, however,
in a number of cases the companies went ahead and employed leaders who
had displayed pro-extraction attitudes, disregarding the community elec-
tions.12 For the local populations inBolivia—as for indigenous communities
10. Public letter to Bolivia’s President Evo Morales, Caraparicito, 28 February 2014.
11. In 2007, a supreme decree about socio-environmental monitoring in the hydrocarbon sector
(SD 29103), which was co-authored and strongly supported by the Guaranı´, was released.
It required that companies pay 0.5 per cent of each project’s total investment into a fund
for sponsoring local monitors, in order to guarantee their independence in supervising
the companies. However, many years have now passed and this decree has still not been
implemented. It remains the companies’ decision to finance any local monitors.
12. Interviews in Parapitiguasu.
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affected by resource extraction elsewhere (see Parlee, 2015) — the loss of
their leaders to the extraction companies means that communities face short-
ages of skilled and knowledgeable community members able to defend their
interests and represent their concerns. Additionally, the fact that they are
being paid by the company has severely reduced the likelihood that those
employed will be critical of company practices. In our interviews with 12
local socio-environmental monitors, the interviewees told us they were very
cautious about criticizing the companies because they feared losing their
jobs or not being employed again by an extraction company.13 One national
APG leader told us about his inner conflicts when working for a company:
when there were debates between the company and the communities about
the impact of a project, ‘I was not able to say anything, because I was con-
tracted by them, I was gagged. I could not argue against the company YPFB
Andina that paid for my work, nor could I speak in favour of the APG.
I felt like a circus clown balancing on a tightrope’.14 In several consulta-
tion cases where parallel leadership structures have existed, the MHE has
only signed final agreements with government-friendly and pro-extractive
organizations, bypassing the more critical ones (Bascope´ Sanjine´s, 2010;
Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012). In doing so, the government has
attempted to avoid long, difficult and expensive consultation processes.
On some occasions, the companies and state entities have even issued
threats against or sanctioned critical local leaders or confrontational com-
munities. For example, when the local communities from Parapitiguasu cap-
taincy mobilized against gas activities in their territory in 2012, they were
confronted not only with security forces, but also with the reduction of so-
cial investment funds paid by the public companyYPFB.15 The communities
from Alto Parapeti were sanctioned by the MHE when they decided to block
an ongoing consultation process: the MHE refused to pay the agreed daily
allowance for the consultation participants, including the travel allowances
for the participants to return to their communities.
Contesting Divide-and-Rule from Below
As many Guaranı´ captaincies have been affected by divide-and-rule tac-
tics like those described above, some of them — especially those that are
stronger and more unified — have developed countervailing strategies. At
the national level, the APG has, in its assemblies, comprehensively discussed
the divisions and frictions that have emerged within the captaincies in rela-
tion to hydrocarbon activities and stated that ‘[t]he accumulated experience
13. Interviews in Parapitiguasu and Takovo Mora; interviews, national APG staff, Camiri,
November 2013.
14. Interview, national APG leader, Camiri, 7 November 2013.
15. Interviews in Parapitiguasu.
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of the Guaranı´ people with extraction companies has revealed that they gen-
erate ruptures in our own organic structures, . . . generate conflicts within our
organizations and they promote corruption by fostering individual interests’
(see MHE, 2010 [unpaged]).
These discussions have manifested in the formulation of specific pro-
visions in the APG’s proposal for a law on prior consultation, aimed at
counteracting divisive practices (APG, 2013; on the drafting of such a law
see Fontana and Grugel, 2016; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017b). For instance, the
APG’s proposal foresees that indigenous representatives would establish a
consultation plan with a sufficient budget for community activities, meet-
ings, assemblies and other internal deliberative spaces to take joint decisions
and to avoid exclusionary practices. To offset state and corporate carrot-and-
stick techniques, the APG’s law proposal specifies that prior consultation
processes shall be carried out according to the indigenous peoples’ own
norms and procedures. Any final consultation agreement achieved by exer-
cising or using pressure, intimidation, bribery, blackmail or violence shall
be declared invalid. Unfortunately, these proposals have not been incorpo-
rated into the government’s proposal for a law on prior consultation (VII
Comisio´n Nacional, 2013).
In addition to such national initiatives to neutralize divisive practices,
Charagua Norte captaincy (located close to Parapitiguasu), which is known
for its unified and strong organizational capacity (Bascope´ Sanjı´nes, 2010),
incorporated the following provision into the final consultation agreement
about the perforation of new gas wells: ‘[When] carrying out any activities
it is not sufficient to obtain the permit from the directly affected community.
Rather the permit must always come from the Charagua Norte captaincy.
This is important for avoiding internal conflicts, because all revenues and
benefits we receive are the property of all 30 communities that are part of
the captaincy’ (MHE, 2011 [unpaged]).
In 2012, when the large gas plant Rio Grande was built close to the com-
munity of Iguazurenda in Takovo Mora captaincy — which together with
Alto Parapeti has accumulated the most experience with consultation pro-
cesses and the negotiation of compensation— the company tried to convince
community leaders to negotiate the compensation without the presence of
other captaincy members.16 Interestingly, in this case the community re-
sisted the temptation to achieve greater individual benefits by entering into
an exclusive negotiation process. The zone’s directorate had previously and
repeatedly discussed the question, very openly, of how to maintain its unity
in assemblies, thereby cementing the principle that every community has to
benefit equally from compensation payments (ibid.).
16. Interviews, ca. 30 community members and indigenous leaders, Takovo Mora, November
2014.
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UNDERMINING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPANDING
RESOURCE EXTRACTION
The divide-and-rule tactics described above have been part of the broader
shortcomings that have characterized consultation processes in Bolivia,
which, in the words of Perreault (2015: 434–35) have been ‘intended not
to foster meaningful participation, but rather to depoliticize extractive ac-
tivities, defuse tensions, and enrol community members in state projects of
resource extraction’.
Based on an ethnography of indigenous rights practices, we show that
the exclusionary manner in which prior consultation processes and related
negotiations over compensation are carried out in Bolivia bears the seri-
ous risk of enhancing the power of subnational elites while marginalizing
other local voices, visions and claims. Simultaneously, the benefits related
to participation in consultation processes and compensation have often been
distributed very unequally; uneven constraints and incentives to participate
have correlated with local inequalities and power asymmetries (see Akbulut,
2012: 1134). Women, the elderly, and people with low levels of educa-
tion or people who only know an indigenous language have been clearly
underrepresented in participation and negotiation processes (Eichler, 2016).
Hence, by drawing on our findings we do not simply argue that, in practice,
consultation and compensation rights represent ‘not a vehicle for the poor,
but another means of their exclusion’ (Dill, 2009: 739). Rather, this article
provides new insights about the fundamentally important question of who
wins and who loses at the local level as a consequence of what Li (2014:
593) has called the ‘global land investment assemblage’.
While divisive practices and their effects are not new phenomena among
the Guaranı´, the engagement of individual Guaranı´ leaders by the hydrocar-
bon industry offers them previously unseen opportunities and goes hand in
hand with new responsibilities. Guaranı´ leaders have previously mainly ful-
filled the task of being spokespersons for their communities and captaincies.
Now, many leaders administer large sums of money and take important de-
cisions regarding employment opportunities for hydrocarbon corporations.
However, they have often done this in a way that has not fostered the com-
mon good, but has primarily benefited their closer environment. Guaranı´
leaders have increasingly been criticized by their constituencies for having
failed to consult with them before taking important decisions. According to
Hirsch (1999: 72), this is one of the worst criticisms that can be made about
a Mburuvicha (Guaranı´ leader).
From an ethnohistoric perspective we could, moreover, interpret the cur-
rent dynamics involving Bolivia’s Guaranı´ as the strengthening of more
hierarchical and authoritarian Chane´ political cultures relative to the Guaranı´
ideal of egalitarian political systems. While at the local level decision mak-
ing within the APG has usually been more inclusive and consensus-based,
and has seen many women in leadership roles, at the captaincy and at
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the national level, a more authoritarian, male-dominated and self-interested
leadership style has increasingly taken root. However, our study also shows
that various internal contestations are at work and that initiatives have been
established by Guaranı´ groups to strengthen or re-establish their unity and
the downward accountability of their organizations. Such struggles are of
fundamental importance, not only for the strength and legitimacy of the
Guaranı´’s self-governing structures, but also with regard to the possibility
of achieving their collective aims of self-determined development and the
control of collective territories (see APG, 2008).
The original hope of indigenous peoples in Bolivia when they demanded
the implementation of state-led consultation processes was that the state
would act as an intermediary between them and the extraction corporations.
The state was expected to tip the power balance in favour of indigenous peo-
ples, thereby contributing to upholding indigenous rights and protecting local
environments. Unfortunately, this expectation has been widely frustrated in
practice, because the state entities involved have assumed pro-extraction
attitudes in consultation processes (Humphreys Bebbington, 2012; Pelle-
grini and Arismendi, 2012; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2017a). Strikingly, this study
shows that instead of being a guarantor of rights, theMHE consultation team
has used divide-and-rule tactics in consultation processes. It also evinces
the blurred lines between the state and the hydrocarbon corporations —
especially the public one — in neo-extractivist Bolivia. Examples such as
that fromParapitiguasu captaincywhere leaderswho assumed pro-extraction
attitudes in prior consultation processes were rewarded with employment by
YPFB are revealing in this regard.
Thus, even in a state like Bolivia, which has legally recognized particu-
larly strong indigenous rights and which has been characterized by its recent
shift towards post-neoliberalism and neo-extractivism, the state and capital
have formed pro-extraction assemblages— political, legal and economic—
that have exercised downward pressure on local communities (see Goodale,
2016). As in the cases covered in this article, such resource assemblages
usually bring together the financial and political interests of extractive con-
glomerates with local ‘micro-capitalists’ (Goodale, 2016; Li, 2010). In such
a disadvantageous context for putting indigenous rights into practice, ‘hard’
markers of indigenous rights promotion (Goodale, 2016) like territorial self-
determination or co-decision making are severely constrained.
We have shown in detail how the indigenous rights to consultation and
compensation,which are embedded in the larger power relations at play, have
become skewed. These insights add to previous research into the practice of
human and indigenous rights (see Goodale and Merry, 2007; Wilson, 1997).
After decades of legally recognizing indigenous rights, much literature has
been produced about the ‘implementation gap’ and about the ambiguous
effects of indigenous rights in practice, especially in Latin America (Anthias
and Radcliffe, 2015; Gustafson, 2002; Hale, 2002; McNeish, 2008; Sieder,
2016). For example, Anthias and Radcliffe (2015) discuss the ambiguous
Divide-and-Rule Tactics in Bolivia’s Extraction Sector 1457
nature of indigenous rights to land and territory, which should protect indige-
nous rights on the one hand, but which have also enhanced the governability
of territories earmarked for extraction on the other. Goodale (2016) recently
argued that there was a ‘dramatic disconnect’ between the symbolic-political
accomplishments of recognizing indigenous rights on the one hand and the
continuing political-economic assimilation and exploitation of indigenous
peoples and territories on the other. In the same vein, Postero (2007: 8) has
formulated the following, important question: ‘[w]hat does multiculturalism
mean when “traditional indigenous” lifestyles are recognized by the consti-
tution but swallowed up by the economic realities of rapid urbanization or
resource exploitation?’.
Against this backdrop, our study shines a light on the micropolitics that
have undermined indigenous rights and have caused adverse sociopoliti-
cal and sociocultural impacts among indigenous populations affected by
resource extraction. We have shown how indigenous territories and self-
governing structures are ‘swallowed up’ by the economic realities of re-
source exploitation. Our findings are relevant not only for gaining a better
understanding of the particular ways in which divide-and-rule tactics are
tied to consultation and compensation processes, but also for establishing
countervailing strategies against divisive practices and their adverse conse-
quences.
CONCLUSIONS
While the rights to prior consultation, FPIC and compensation are conceived
of as tools for empowering indigenous peoples and enhancing their collec-
tive rights, our findings from concrete state-led consultation processes and
company-led negotiations over compensation payments in Bolivia show that
these practices have also had a shady side: they have caused serious adverse
social consequences at the local level. Our study reveals that divide-and-rule
tactics used by the state and extraction corporations alike have particularly
exacerbated local conflicts, debilitated indigenous organizational structures
and divided communities. The basis of this study consists of ethnographic
insights and interviews about exclusionary participatory processes and the
use of carrot-and-stick techniques in consultation processes and negotiations
over compensation. Our findings speak to academic debates about partici-
pation in development and about the ‘subterranean techniques’ (Sawyer,
2003) that corporations have frequently applied in neoliberal contexts. In
addition, our analysis adds to previous literature on the practice of human
and indigenous rights, particularly with regard to the ‘implementation gap’
and the ambiguous effects of indigenous peoples’ rights.
We have embedded our findings within the specific context of Bolivia —
the state which has recognized indigenous rights to the greatest extent world-
wide and which has recently shifted towards neo-extractivism — and have
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contextualized our study within the ethnohistorical context of the country’s
Guaranı´ people. However, the broader implications of our study regarding
indigenous rights and indigenous politics in the context of expanding natural
resource extraction are likely to be of relevance well beyond the Bolivian
borders. Since Bolivia has been one of the few countries to date to implement
prior consultation processes in the extractive industries, experiences there
contain important lessons for consultation and compensation practices yet
to be implemented in other resource-rich countries and regions.
The article sheds light on the adverse sociocultural consequences of con-
sultation and compensation processes for local populations affected by re-
source extraction — a topic of great practical relevance, but which has
received little attention in previous academic debates. Both the question
of how concrete divide-and-rule tactics and practices unfold in different
local places, and the investigation into potential measures for overcoming
them, merit more in-depth and comparative analysis. Indeed, this will be
imperative in order to avoid the actual disempowerment of local popula-
tions, particularly their weakest constituents, by instruments of community
engagement that should protect collective rights and lead to emancipatory
transformation.
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